The Use of Posed Photographs of Movable Objects or Persons at the Time of an Accident; A Proposed Change by Shafer, Nelson E.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 47 | Issue 1 Article 9
1958
The Use of Posed Photographs of Movable Objects
or Persons at the Time of an Accident; A Proposed
Change
Nelson E. Shafer
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Evidence Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shafer, Nelson E. (1958) "The Use of Posed Photographs of Movable Objects or Persons at the Time of an Accident; A Proposed
Change," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 47 : Iss. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol47/iss1/9
THE USE OF POSED PHOTOGRAPHS OF MOVABLE OBJECTS
OR PERSONS AT THE TIME OF AN ACCIDENT;
A PROPOSED CHANGE
'Photography . . . is not merely one of those subjects every lawyer
should understand but probably doesn't; it is an essential medium for
the presentation of evidence that all lawyers should master."'
Introduction
Since the inception of practical photography in 1839,2 it has under-
gone many revolutionary changes and far-reaching applications which
would provide a sufficient source of material for a monumental treatise.
Therefore, to provide a workable topic, this note has been narrowly
restricted to a consideration, criticism, and challenge of an existing
rule relating to the use of certain posed photographs as evidence in
civil trials.
In General
A photograph, like a map or diagram, is a "non-verbal mode of
expressing a witness' testimony" and, for evidential purposes, is simply
nothing except so far as it has a human being's credit to support it. 3
Consequently, as a preliminary foundation for the admission of photo-
graphs, they must be "verified" 4 by a testimonial sponsor as correctly
expressing his observation and recollection of the data in question.5
In addition it must be relevant and material, i.e., the subject matter of
the photograph must tend to establish or disprove facts on trial, and
assist a witness in explaining his testimony so that the jury may better
understand the case.6
It may also be well to note that, although the cases have not made
it clear, photographs are admissible either to illustrate testimony, or
to stand as independent evidence having its own probative force or
value.7 Photographs have been distinguished8 from maps, diagrams
and models to the extent that: (1) the average juror will accept a
photograph as correct on blind faith (as an accurate machine-made
I Scott, Photographic Evidence, Preface p. v (1942).
2 Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 17, p. 804 (1956).
3 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 790 at 174 (3d ed. 1940).
4 Annot. 9 A.L.R. 2d 899 (1950).
5 3 Wigmore, supra note 3, sec. 793.
0 Scott, supra, note 1, sec. 602.
7 Gardner, "The Camera Goes to Court," 24 N.C.L.R. 233, 239 (1945-1946);
see also 3 Duke BJ. 60 (1952-1953); cf. 9C Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile
Law and Practice, sec. 6353 (1954).8 Scott, "Medicolegal Photography, 18 Rocky Mtn. L. R. 173, 189-190
(1945-1946).
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reproduction of nature) whereas he knows that a map or drawing is
entirely the creation of some man's mind and hand; (2) the mirror-
like appearance of a photograph makes it capable of inciting passion
and prejudice in the jury, while a lifeless map or drawing of the same
object rarely has this effect; (3) a photograph has also been accorded
the attribute of being an artificial eyewitness in that it speaks with a
certain probative force itself.
It must be remembered that a photograph is not infallible; among
the more common sources of photographic misrepresentation are the
position of the camera, type of lens used, lighting, retouching, reversed
negatives, and double printing.9 But the remedy for such abuses is
not in excluding honest photographs; we do not dispense with all
witnesses because some are prejurers.10 An objection to the use of
posed photographs because of the possibility of misrepresentation
should go "to the weight of the photograph as evidence, rather than
to its admissibility."" To illustrate by way of analogy, in one recent
case an expert witness testified that,12 in his opinion, the Harger
Drunkometer (alcohol breath) test was accurate, but admitted that
there were others who disagreed with him. It was held that objections
to the extent to which the scientific test is accepted goes to the weight
of the evidence, rather than its admissibility.
The Problem
There is a conflict of authority as to the admissibility of posed
photographs at the scene of a highway collision showing vehicles re-
placed in their tracks to illustrate positions at the time of the accident,
where they are intended to represent the theory of one party as
opposed to the other when there is a dispute as to the correct position
of the colliding vehicles. 13 The same conflict obtains in cases involving
accidents between automobiles and pedestrians,14 or trains and auto-
mobiles.15 The same is true where an injured person or his repre-
sentative is placed in the position the injured man allegedly occupied
at the time of the accident.' 6
"Accuracy of reproduction" would appear to be the rule-of-thumb
test of admissibility of posed photographs illustrative of the testimony
9 Gardner, "The Camera Goes to Court," 24 N.C.L.R. 233, 236-238 (1945-
1946).lo Id. at 235.
117 N.C.L.R. 443, 447-448 (1928-1929); see also, Busch, Law and Tactics
in Jury Trials, see. 265 (1949).
12 McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. Rpts. 416, 235 S.W. 2d 173 (1950).
13 Scott, supra note 1, sec. 671 at 587.
14 Id., sec. 672 at 591. 15 Id., see. 676 at 607.16 Id., see. 679 at 616.
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of witnesses provided a proper foundation has been laid by pre-
liminary testimony showing that the objects and situations por-
trayed are faithfully represented.17 Gases holding that posed photo-
graphs are inadmissible because they portray a hypothetical situation
or a theory of one of the parties, as distinguished from the actual sit-
uation, merely seem to apply this "accuracy test."' 8 This is a succinct
summary as to the status of posed photographs in Kentucky, where
the courts permit the use of posed photographs when they depict con-
ditions substantially as they were, and not according to the theory of
one party or the other.19
[I]t is important that the jury shall have as clear an understanding
of the situation as can be fluished, and relevant information may be
conveyed to them by pictures or models that they can see and ex-
amine.... [MAe can think of no sound reason why a photograph
that furnished an accurate reproduction of objects and places and
things that are germane to the matter being investigated are not as
competent as the other aids (maps, models and diagrams) that we
have mentioned. 20
However, where a photograph is introduced to show the precise
position of an injured party or the location of a moving or movable
object at the time of an accident, the photograph is deemed self-serving
not corroborative, and therefore incompetent.2 1 While only two Ken-
tucky cases have been found to be directly in point, their influence
may have restricted the subsequent growth and development of this
phase of the law.
Welch v. Louisville and N.R. Co.2 2 was a personal injury action
wherein plaintiff sought to recover damages for injuries caused by
flying debris from a railroad collision. Plaintiff secured a photog-
rapher to take her picture where she was allegedly standing on a
nearby public road at the time when she was struck, but her testimony
on trial was to the effect that she was by, not on, the road at the time
of the accident. The court held that the picture was inadmissible since
it was essentially a self-serving declaration, and also hearsay on the
part of the photographer, as if he had taken the stand and testified
as to where plaintiff was standing at the time of the accident. This,
it is submitted, was "erroneous reasoning to reach a proper result"
1 7tAnnot. 19 A.L.R. 2d 877, 880 (1951), supplementing 27 A.L.R. 913
(1923).
1Id., fn. 1, at 882.
19Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Bell, 276 Ky. 778, 125 S.W. 2d 239 (1939);
Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Duvall, 263 Ky. 387, 92 S.W. 2d 363 (1936);
Bowling Green Gaslight Co. v. Dean's Ex'x., 142 Ky. 678, 134 S.W. 1115 (1911).20 Bowling Green Gaslight Co. v. Dean's Ex'x., 142 Ky. 678 at 686, 134 S.W.
1115 at 1118 (1911).
21 Nunnelleys Admr. v. Muth, 195 Ky. 352, 242 S.W. 622, 27 A.L.R. 910
(1922); Welch v. Louisville and N. R. Co., 164 Ky. 100, 173 S.W. 838 (1915).
22163 Ky. 100, 173 S.W. 388 (1915).
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under the facts. The picture was tendered as part of the plaintiff's
own testimony, not that of the photographer, and was no more self-
serving than if she had orally testified as to what the picture portrayed.
In reality, the photograph should have been excluded because it de-
picted conditions inconsistent with the plaintiff's own testimony and,
therefore, could not even serve for purposes of "illustration." While
the photograph was made out of court, it was not, in effect, a "state-
ment" made out of court so as to be excluded under the self-serving
declaration rule.23
In Nunnelley's Adm'r. v. Muth,24 plaintiff's intestate was killed
after being struck by defendant's truck as he, the decedent, started to
cross the street from behind a parked automobile. A witness of the
tragedy later returned to the scene with a photographer, and pictures
were taken to indicate the witness' conception of the respective loca-
tions of the automobile and truck when the decedent first became
visible to the truck driver. The witness also placed a person in the
position which he allegedly occupied, as well as one where the de-
cedent allegedly stood. Inasmuch as there was a diversity of opinion
as to where the decedent stood in reference to the truck when he
started to cross the street, the court embraced the Welch decision and
declared that the photograph was properly excluded. The court
reasoned that it amounted to a self-serving, non-corroborative, ocular
demonstration of the witness' conception of the location of the injured
party, or other moving objects, at the time of the accident, i.e., it was
inadmissible because it represented the theory of one side, as opposed
to that of the other.
No two witnesses, even though similarly situated, ever "see" an
accident in an identical manner, much less can they report it in the
same manner when called as witnesses; training, memory capacity,
emotion, awareness and personality are variable components of the
observing mind.25 Conceding that the posed photographs in the
Nunnelley and Welch cases were in accord with, and represented the
theory of, one party as opposed to the other, they did not represent a
hypothetical situation as such, but rather, the actual situation as seen
by a witness who verifiies the picture as an accurate presentation of
what he saw. To that extent, any verified posed photograph is an
accurate reproduction of a witness' actual observation, illustrating
facts within his knowledge, and not mere conclusions, opinion or hear-
say. To hold that a photograph is inadmissible merely because it
23 Infra. p. 121.
24 195 Ky. 352, 242 S.W. 622, 27 A.L.R. 910 (1922).
251 Belli, Modem Trials, sec. 4 at 16 (1954).
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represents the theory of one party as opposed to another apparently
disregards other features pertaining to a party's "theory", viz., (1) if
two eye-witnesses observe the same accident, one pursuant to the
plaintiff's theory, and the other according to the defendant's theory,
both witnesses would be able to testify as to what they saw, although
their respective testimony represents the theory of one party as opposed
to the other, and the jury would then "find the facts" by weighing
the admitted evidence according to the credibility accorded each wit-
ness; (2) each party to a suit has a right to have the jury instructed so
as to present his theory and case where the evidence or facts tend to
sustain them. 26
A "self-serving" declaration, within the rule excluding such declar-
ations, is one made by a party in his own interest at some place and
time out of court, but does not include testimony which he gives as a
witness at the trial.2 7 Although the Welch case involved a photograph
offered by a party to the action, it was of no evidential merit until
"sponsored" at the trial by some competent witness28 and would appear
to come within the exception to the "self-serving" declaration rule, as
being part of the party's testimony given at the trial. The photographs
in the Nunnelley case were not even part of the testimony of a party
to the action, but rather, by a witness who merely observed the tragedy.
Undoubtedly, the holding in the Nunnelley case was proper in one
respect; the witness, whose pictures were tendered, died before the
trial occurred and was therefore unable to be cross-examined. Aside
from that, however, when a witness has a picture taken to illustrate
his version of the location of persons or moving objects at the time of
an accident, even though such locations are contested, there appears
to be no sound reason for excluding that which has been preserved
on film, while admitting the same information by oral testimony, pro-
vided: (1) general surroundings depicted by the photograph are sub-
stantially the same as those at the time of the accident; (2) the photo-
graph will aid the jury in understanding the witness' testimony and
descriptions; (3) there is an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
as to what he has said and shown.
Our trials are based on the adversary system, and a conflict of oral
testimony is to be expected. Why should more be required in the use
of posed photographs? To elicit in detailed testimony that which
20 Maupin v. Baker, 302 Ky. 411, 194 S.W. 2d 991 (1946); Cincinnati N. 0.
& T. P. Ry. Co. v. Terry, 267 Ky. 707, 103 S.W. 2d 65 (1987); Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. of the United States v. Green, 259 Ky. 773, 88 S.W. 2d 478 (1935).2 7 Toney v. Raines, 224 Ark. 692, 275 S.W. 2d 771 at 774 (1955); Hill v.
Talbert, 210 Ark. 866, 197 S.W. 2d 942 at 944 (1946).
28 3 Wigmore, supra note 3 at 174.
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might readily be shown on a photograph could unduly prolong the
trial and cause the jury to become bored and disinterested. One pic-
ture is worth a thousand proverbial words, and may well expedite
legal proceedings while maintaining the jury's "enthusiasm." Who
hasn't known individual jurors to disregard what transpires from time
to time?
While the proposition has no direct support, it is reasonable to
infer2 9 that a witness may use an accurate photograph of an accident
scene to indicate or point out the location of persons or things, even
though such location is controverted. Conceding this much, it is dif-
ficult to see why the same matter should not be incorporated within
the photograph itself.
Finally, the mere fact that photographs may impress the jury more
strongly than other forms of evidence, and thereby emphasize one
party's version of the facts somewhat, is by no means a conclusive
argument for their exclusion. No one could reasonably contend that
a persuasive advocate or personable witness should be excluded from
a trial merely because of their peculiarly impressive attributes. By
recognizing posed photographs for what they are, viz., a means to
illustrate otherwise competent evidence, it would seem that such
material, used merely to illustrate the testimony of a witness, need
not be subjected to the strict proof of accuracy required for that which
is offered as independent evidence,3 0 especially when the jury is prop-
erly instructed on the matter. There is a distinction between the use
of photographs as an independent piece of evidence to prove a pard-
cular fact, and those used merely to supplement, illustrate and aid in
the presentation of a witness' testimony for a better understanding
by the court and jury.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Realizing some of the prospective dangers which might inhere in
the unbridled use of posed photographs, it is nevertheless believed that
they could and should be used more frequently to facilitate and illus-
trate presentation of evidence whenever and wherever practicable. It
is believed that much of the danger arising from the use of posed
photographs could be alleviated by borrowing from some of the prin-
ciples enunciated for the taking of Depositions upon Oral Examina-
tions31 and/or Depositions of Witnesses upon Written Interroga-
29 Nolan v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 852, 226 S.W. 2d 27 (1950); Sund v.
Keating, 43 Wash. 2d 36, 259 P. 2d 1113 (1953); Desimone v. Mutual Materials
Co., 23 Wash. 2d 876, 162 P. 2d 808 (1945).
30 See Ross v. McLain, 246 S.W. 2d 1012, 1013 (Ky. 1952).
3 1 Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 30.
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tories.3 2 To illustrate, when it is desired to make exparte posed photo-
graphs, timely notice should be given to all other parties to the ac-
tion;3 3 after notice is served and a motion seasonably made, the court
in which the action is pending may, upon a good cause shown, make
such orders as justice requires,34 and the person who is to direct the
placing of the objects for photographs could be put on oath so that
his "visual testimony" may be recorded on film.3 5 (The photographer
might also be sworn to preserve testimony that the pictures he took
accurately portrayed the reconstructed scene). This procedure would
provide an adverse party with an opportunity to observe how the
scene is being reconstructed and recorded. Objections to any part of
the proceedings or methods employed could be noted36 at the scene
by an officer3 7 or, if none were present, reserved for the pre-trial con-
ference38s after due notice of the objectionable matter is given to the
other party so that he may have an opportunity to remedy the
situation.39 Similarly, if photographs were desired before an action
or pending appeal, general procedures set forth under Depositions
Before Action or Pending Appeal40 could be followed, as could the
procedure for depositions to be taken out of the state,41 or for those
to be used out of the state,4 if the desired photographs come within
either category.
While the above procedure may appear unduly burdensome at
first blush, there should be no great difficulty shifting or extending
its application so as to cover "filmed depositions" while providing an
opportunity of materially reducing chances of error and misrepre-
sentation. An adverse party could check the type of film used, light-
ing, position of camera, general surroundings, etc.
The clue to another possible solution of the problem may be found
in the following excerpt:
[T]he decisions are not in accord on the admissibility of photographs
showing (persons other than the defendant) or objects relocated at
the scene of a crime in the position of the participants or objects
according to the testimony of witnesses. By the great weight of au-
thority, even though there is a dispute as to the accuracy of the
positions assumed, such photographs are admissible, not as irrefutable
32 Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 31.
33 Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 30.01, 31.01.
s4 Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 80.02, 31.03.
35 Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 30.03.
s6 Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 30.03.
3 7 Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 28.01.38 Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 16.39 Ky. B. Civ. P., Rule 32.03.4 o Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 27.
41 Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 28.02.42 Ky. R. Civ. P., Rule 28.03.
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proof of what in fact occurred, but as illustrations of the testimony
of the witness vouching for the accuracy of the pictures. 43
This parallels a proposition tendered earlier-objections should go
to the weight of the photograph as evidence, rather than its admissibil-
ity, and unless it is manifestly misleading or prejudicial, it should be
admitted to provide a better understanding of the witness' conception
of what transpired.
As a final alternative solution, any posed photographs might be
allowed if certain simple requirements are met: (1) The photograph
should be an accurate representation of subject matter within the
witness' own observation and knowledge, and this subject matter as
portrayed should be consistent with the witness' own testimony. The
photograph should not be allowed if it merely represents a hypothe-
tical situation which may have arisen. (2) There should be a rela-
tively equal opportunity for all parties to obtain posed photographs
through examination of witnesses. (3) Parties should be given an
opportunity to cross-examine any witness who testifies with the aid of
posed photographs; such cross-examination may touch upon both oral
testimony and matters related to the photograph. (4) The jury should
be admonished that the photographs offered in evidence are merely
illustrative of a witness' testimony, and not conclusively binding as
an established fact.
Perhaps a combination of the foregoing recommendations would
ultimately be the best and most practical safeguard in this branch
of the law of evidence.
Nelson E. Shafer
43 Scott, Photographic Evidence, sec. 692 at 653 (1942).
